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Kathy Cerminara: Good afternoon everyone. Today we have with us Christopher
Jennings, one of our Goodwin Series speakers. Chris Jennings served as Senior Health Policy
Advisor and Deputy Assistant for Health Policy to President Bill Clinton. As Deputy Assis-
tant to the President for Health Policy, working out of the President's Domestic Policy
Council and in conjunction with the National Economic Council, Jennings was in charge of
developing the Administration's health care policy. In this capacity, beginning in 1994, he
coordinated the health policy work of numerous federal agencies, including the Office of
Management and Budget and the Departments of Health and Human Services, Treasury, and
Labor. As the President's Senior Health Policy Advisor, Jennings advised the President on a
wide variety of issues, including Medicare, Medicaid, long term care, insurance coverage
expansions, and consumer protection. Recognizing his work, the National Journal in 1997
designated Mr. Jennings as one of Washington's 100 most influential individuals in the
federal government.
Before his White House appointment, from 1993 to 1994, Jennings was the Senior
Legislative Health Reform Advisor to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), and
during his tenure in this position he worked with first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, preparing
her for testimony on Capitol Hill regarding health care reform. Prior to joining the Clinton
Administration, Mr. Jennings served as a committee staff member for Senators Glenn,
Belcher, and Pryor. Today he is going to talk about health care policy and about what we can
do, or maybe, what we should think about when we are reforming the health care system in
America.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I had an extraordinary experience as Health Care Advisor to the Presi-
dent in the Clinton White House and I want to talk to you a little bit about
what we have done. More importantly, I have been asked to talk about how
we can improve the heath care system in this political world that we live in
and how we can apply some of the lessons we learned to the future.
There is no question that the Clinton Administration experienced both
the thrill of victory and the agony of defeat in our continuous struggle to
reform and to improve the nation's health system. Beyond the record,
however, I believe there were many significant lessons learned that can and
should be applied to future efforts to reform health care in the United States.
The most important of these are the critical steps of effectively defining the
problem, establishing the goals for reform, developing viable policy, and
designing a workable strategy to pass and enact legislation.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM; ESTABLISHING GOALS FOR REFORM
Before embarking on any major reform, one has to effectively define
the problem. Without first achieving broad agreement that there is a prob-
lem that virtually all understand and determine is worth addressing, it is
impossible to proceed with meaningful reforms. Although it may seem that
the problems of health care in this country are universally understood, many
of the examples I will subsequently share will illustrate that defining the
problem can actually be one of the most complicated parts of shaping health
policy.
As important as defining the problem, though, is establishing objec-
tives for change. Just as there are many differing opinions on the flaws (and
strengths) of the health care system, there are just as many perspectives on
what the goals of reforms should be. By providing examples of some of the
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most prominent issues in health care today, I will try to illustrate how the
broadly differing views people have about the problems and desired out-
comes for reform severely complicate any effort to improve the nation's
health care system.
A- The Uninsured
The fact that more than forty million Americans lack health insurance is
commonly believed to be the crux of the health care problem in this coun-
try. Improving access to health coverage is generally viewed as a primary
goal of health care reform. But even this seemingly obvious conclusion has
not achieved a consensus status.
Opponents of reform frequently argue that there really is not a problem
of access; they suggest that anyone without a preexisting condition can
purchase relatively affordable health insurance. They also argue that this
issue is not, nor should be, a national domestic policy priority because the
problem fs overstated, as anyone can go into an emergency room and receive
care, regardless of insurance status.
All the arguments and research to the contrary do not sway opponents
of major change.
For instance, one can cite the fact that the percentage of uninsured
adults who do not receive medical care is more than three times that of
2privately insured Americans. Or, one can point out that the uninsured are
fifty to seventy percent more likely to need hospitalization for avoidable and
expensive health conditions, like pneumonia and uncontrollable diabetes,
than those who have private insurance.3 The fact that children without
health insurance are nearly twice as likely to forego health care for condi-
tions like asthma or recurrent ear infections, which can lead to serious
problems throughout life, does not break through either.4
1. Robert Mills, Health Insurance Coverage: 2000, at 1, U.S. CENsus BUREAU,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P60-215 (2001).
2. Linda Blumberg & David W. Liska, The Uninsured in the United States: A Status
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B. Access to Coverage
Clearly, the insurance coverage issue reflects the difficult nature of
identifying health care problems and corresponding goals. Even assuming a
sufficient base of bipartisan support for the general notion of policies to
expand insurance, (which parenthetically, I believe there generally is), there
are so many other issues. Even when policymakers advocate for all Ameri-
cans having health insurance, it becomes necessary to define what that
means in order to develop policy and consensus around it. Does it mean that
all Americans should have health insurance or should they have access to
health insurance? Access to health insurance and actually having health
insurance can be two very different concepts. Universal coverage requires a
Federal mandate; universal access to coverage does not necessarily require
one. However, the latter is generally less efficient and more costly per
person covered.
In addition, there is no broad agreement about what type and level of
coverage is minimally necessary to be defined as acceptable health insur-
ance. Does it mean comprehensive, first-dollar coverage, catastrophic stop-
loss coverage, or something in between? Similarly vexing is the definition
of affordability. Does affordability mean insurance premiums should not be
greater than a percentage of income, or does it mean an explicit dollar
amount? What are the levels of government subsidies that are necessary,
desirable and/or acceptable to make health care affordable for individuals
and businesses? And, most importantly, how are they to be financed?
A similar challenge is how to define and assure quality of health care.
This becomes frequently something more akin to the Supreme Court's
definition of pornography; you cannot define it, but you know it when you
see it. And finally, how do you weigh the relative importance of each one of
these essential issues? The following sampling of issues gives a sense of
how complicated and controversial health care can be and why I believe it to
be the most challenging domestic policy issue confronting the nation.
Im. HEALTH CARE ISSUES THAT CHALLENGE THE NATION
A. Choice
A commonly identified health care policy problem is lack of choice.
People constantly say that they want more choices in health care, but what
does that mean? What should our goals be in this area? Do we want more
choice of health plans? Assured choice of doctors? What about more choice
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of technology and new drugs? Do we need more choice of covered benefits?
If choice increases costs, do we want choice in all cases? Choice often
segments the healthy from the unhealthy, making it more difficult to af-
fordably cover the most vulnerable populations. Is that an outcome we
desire? In short, the concept of choice makes for great rhetoric, but not
always great policy. Rarely is there a consensus around the definition or the
desired outcome.
B. Health Care Costs
In identifying important problems in health care, it is impossible to
ignore the issue of rising health care costs. Should we care about cost
growth? Do we think that health care cost containment should be a signifi-
cant part of health care reform?
As the largest purchaser of health care in this country, the employer
community would certainly list cost containment as a major priority in
principle. But they rarely pursue it aggressively on the federal legislative
front. Regardless though, should this be a major priority of any federal
government health initiative? If taxpayer dollars are used for subsidizing
health care, should not health care be purchased in the most cost-effective
manner? If so, what is the policy that should be implemented? Should we
rely on price regulation or trust that market competition governed by certain
rules will do the trick? Will those who say they support cost containment
strongly advocate it in the end if it means confronting health care providers
and insurers directly or limiting consumer choices or benefits?
C. Risk Selection and Insurance Reform
When discussing the problems of the health insurance market, there is
more to think about than simply constraining costs. For example, can work-
able and politically viable reforms be structured to assure that insurers
provide affordable health coverage to all Americans, and do not discriminate
against people on the basis of preexisting conditions? In a voluntary market,
would these types of reforms have potentially dire consequences?
For example, what would happen if insurers enrolled every individual
with a preexisting condition at the same price as healthy popula-
tions? Inevitably, people would wait until they were sick to get insurance,
causing insurance prices to skyrocket, as insurers could not afford to provide
health care coverage if they were only insuring sick people. However, in the
absence of insurance reforms, insurers tend to develop and effectively
2002]
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implement strategies to avoid high-risk, high-cost enrollees. Because of
these factors, the current health insurance system encounters all sorts of risk
selection problems, pointing out the need for a balanced set of insurance
reforms as a major health policy goal.
D. Quality
Every American and every policymaker stresses the importance of
quality health care, but no one really knows how to measure, assure, or
improve it. The whole debate around a Patients' Bill of Rights illustrates
this point.5 This debate has been driven by the population of Americans that
has insurance, but is dissatisfied with the product and how it is delivered.
The Patients' Bill of Rights debate has clearly shown that the issue of quality
cannot be ignored, particularly because the Americans who already have
coverage may care more about this issue than covering the uninsured.
Long term care is also a concern. Presently, we do not provide any type
of significant coverage for those people who are chronically ill of all ages,
who want to stay in their home, in their communities, and want to be able to
receive some sort of support for doing so.6 When we do provide care, it is
generally Medicaid.7 We have tens of millions of Americans of all ages who
are chronically ill and need to have assistance.8 Clearly, these are issues that
need attention.
As a consequence, it is critically important to define and assure quality
health care. How can this be done? Is it determined by the availability of
certain health care services, the ability to appeal unsatisfactory health care
decisions, or is there a way to actually measure medical outcomes that can
work to hold plans and health care providers accountable? And lastly,
should there be penalties for health care plans or providers who provide
substandard care, and if so, what should they be, and how should they be
5. Stephanie Lewis, A Guide to the Patients' Bill of Rights Debate, INSTn-uTE FOR
HEALTH CARE REs. & POL'Y, GEO. U. (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.kff.org/content/
2001/3179/DebatePaper.pdf.
6. Democracy Compact, Pledge to Vote, at http://www.pledgetovote.com/vote/
difference.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002). The elderly vote more than any group in the
country.
7. Mills, supra note 1, at 2.
8. Study Says 100 Million Americans Chronically Ill, Nov. 12, 1996, at
http://www.diennet.com/cnnhealth.html. Study, done by researchers at the University of
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applied? Because the state of the art in the health care industry today is such
that quality health care is frequently measured much more subjectively than
objectively, it becomes an extremely challenging issue to address effectively
and satisfactorily to all interested parties.
E. Technology
At the same time as the challenges of health care delivery are becoming
ever more complex, the industry is in the midst of an extraordinary age of
technology, with seemingly constant breakthroughs in pharmacological
interventions, treatments, and diagnostic techniques. 9 These represent great
opportunities to improve the quality of life and to extend the life span.
Recent breakthroughs in gene therapy have perhaps the most significant
implications for the future of health care. 10 Scientists have recently finished
mapping the whole genome, and the implications for this knowledge in the
future are beyond anything that we can imagine."
But while technology produces wonderful diagnostic tools, treatments,
and occasional cures, it also brings to the forefront extraordinary ethical
dilemmas. For example, there are widely differing opinions about the
benefits and potential harms of genetic screening. Should we know about
our gene makeup and our predisposition for disease? This type of informa-
tion could be very useful for insurers or employers, but would we ever want
them to have access to it? Can you imagine people having access to your
medical records or your genetic makeup and how that could be used or
misused in the future? Should health care reform include all those issues
too? How can we effectively balance the positive use of technology with its
potential for abuse? And finally, does our understandable love affair with
technology adequately take into account its expense and its potential for
further dividing the nation between those who have access to it and those
who do not?
9. ROY PORTER, THE GREATEST BENEFrr OF MANKIND, A MEDICAL HISTORY OF
HUMANrry (W.W. Noton & Co. 1997).
10. Id.
11. Optical Mapping: A Complete System For Whole Genome Shotgun Mapping,
available at http://www.oml.gov/hgmis/publicat/00santa/152.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
The website is provided as a service of the Human Genome Project and describes the optical
mapping of the whole genome using the "shotgun mapping" approach.
2002]
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F. Demographic Challenges
Finally, in defining the problems and goals of health reform, it is impor-
tant to determine if the inevitable financing and health delivery challenges
associated with the retirement of the baby boom generation should be ad-
dressed. This demographic challenge is undeniable, as the population of
Medicare beneficiaries will double from forty to eighty million by the year
2035.12 Although competitive reforms over the long term may achieve some
limited savings, the fact remains that if you double the population of people
on Medicare, the cost will likely double as well.
Linked to the demographic challenge is the need for updating the
Medicare benefit to provide for long-overdue prescription drug coverage. It
makes little sense to have a Medicare benefit that does not cover prescription
drugs in the twenty-first century. 13 The whole future of health care is largely
reliant on pharmacological interventions, yet we do not cover an outpatient
prescription drug benefit.' 4 Seniors and people with disabilities care pas-
sionately about this issue because they see the extent to which their health
care is pharmacologically based. They are scared of not having access to
their medications, and fear, as I will note later, is an incredibly powerful
motivating force.
Long-term care is also a concern. Presently, we do not provide any type
of significant coverage for chronically ill individuals of any age, who want
to stay in their communities, and desire to be able to receive some sort of
support for doing so.' 5 When we do provide care, it is generally through the
welfare-oriented Medicaid program.16 As a consequence, we have tens of
millions of Americans of all ages who are chronically ill who receive no
meaningful assistance.' 7 While these demographic problems are undeniable,
they also have great potential to be extremely expensive to address. Policy-
makers risk alienating a powerful constituency if they don't address these
12. Mills, supra note 1, at 2.
13. See Medicare, Medicare Basics, at http://www.medicare.gov/BasicslEligibility
.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
14. Id.
15. Democracy Compact, supra note 6.
16. Mills, supra note 1, at 2.
17. Study Says 100 Million Americans Chronically Ill, Nov. 12, 1996, at
http://www.diennet.concnnhealth.html. Study, done by researchers at the University of
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issues, yet if they do take them on, they also risk weighing down any health
care expansions with expensive, mostly governmental, interventions.
IV. DEVELOPING HEALTH CARE POLICY AND DESIGNING A STRATEGY FOR
ENACTMENT
After effectively defining the problems in the health system that should
be addressed and developing a general consensus on the goals for reform, it
is necessary to design a policy that effectively achieves these goals. The
importance of developing a sound policy cannot be overstated, as the policy
will be forced to undergo extraordinary scrutiny by both objective policy
validators and interests who oppose it. As important as the policy and the
process by which it was developed is the subsequent strategy that is tapped
to pass and enact such reform. My following comments address both of
these essential components of a successful effort to reform the health care
system.
A. Overall Policy Approach
Even before developing explicit policy, it is essential to determine
whether the approach to health care reform will be comprehensive or incre-
mental in nature. There are advantages and disadvantages to both. Obvi-
ously, a comprehensive approach requires a great deal of political capital and
is much more difficult to develop and to advocate. However, a comprehen-
sive approach can also much more efficiently expand coverage to a greater
number of Americans and can do so while addressing the broad range of
financing, insurance reform, quality assurance, and cost containment policies
which are directly and indirectly impacted by any health reform. Con-
versely, a more targeted approach to health reform has the advantage of
being easier to achieve consensus around and doing so with less political risk
and capital expenditure. The downside, of course, is that while such incre-
mental initiatives are more likely to be enacted into law, they almost inevita-
bly cost more per individual assisted and are frequently more likely to incur
unintended consequences.
B. The Policy Development Process
Developing viable policy-from both a structural and political perspec-
tive-is certainly one of the greatest challenges facing anyone advocating
20021
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health reform. It must be developed in a manner that a broad-based coalition
of internal and external policy validators will conclude is workable. To the
extent the policy design fails to work from either a financing or health care
delivery perspective, the policymaker advocating it will almost inevitably
receive merciless and devastating criticism that threatens the very survival of
the proposal.
To achieve success in this area, the talented policy analysts that are
familiar with financing, delivery, history, and practical application of health
policy must be utilized to frame the proposal. If it is an Administration
proposal, contributions to the policy must come from a broad array of inter-
nal power and policy centers such as the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Treasury Department, the Department of Labor, the Office of
Management and Budget, the Domestic Policy Council, and the National
Economic Council. This is important not only so that policymakers can
benefit from various sources of expertise, but also because these depart-
ments' investment in the policy is critically important to ensure a broad-
based, Administration-wide commitment to the eventual proposal released
by the White House. It is also critically important to receive such validation
from elite outside experts that the media and the Congress tap as resources
on questions of policy.
The last policy question that must be answered is whether the proposal
that is released is detailed or general in design. A detailed approach has the
advantage of being able to expedite outsiders' analysis of the proposal; for
example, achieving a relatively certain budget estimate from the Congres-
sional Budget Office. If there is already broad-based support for such a
policy, these details can help accelerate Congressional progress on passing
the legislation. The downside, of course, is that any detailed policy exposes
itself to easier scrutiny and a greater likelihood of explicit and effective
criticism. As such, it frequently becomes more appealing to delay the re-
lease of underlying details to avoid such criticism.
C. Timing and Trust in Government
Even the best of policies will have great potential to fail if they are not
proposed during a time in which the political environment is open to reform.
Generally, that means that there has to be a broad-based acknowledgement
that the problems in the health care delivery system are great enough to
justify legislative intervention. To advocate comprehensive reform, there
almost needs to be a sense of crisis. Ironically, however, there also needs to
be a general trust in the government's ability to intervene in a constructive
[Vol. 26:403
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way. Concurrent with that faith, the public must feel that they can trust the
leader advocating such change. These are all necessary prerequisites, as
health care is so controversial and so complex that the public must trust that
the leader advocating change has their best interest in mind in order to
support reform. Lastly, any policy that is promoted cannot be pursued if
there are too many other policy priorities also being advocated. In order to
both promote and defend a viable health policy, the advocates of that pro-
posal must be available to dedicate a significant amount of time to it.
D. Effective Policy Outreach and Rollout
Beyond securing external validation from the policy elite, it is impera-
tive to develop and implement a strategy that incorporates a broad base of
validators for the initiative. It is necessary to secure the agreement of out-
side validators to lobby the Congress and to illustrate broad-based support
from interest groups that are influential with the public, and therefore the
media. In addition to proving expert support for the policy, securing interest
group involvement increases the number of defenders against the inevitable
opposition to the policy. To achieve this end, it is necessary to understand
the priorities of key health care interest groups, such as consumer groups,
health care providers, insurers, manufacturers, and state and local interests,
and integrate them into both the policy and the strategy for enactment.
Unfortunately, these different interest groups rarely have a uniform
vision, and you often must choose who is going to be on your side from
among these different groups. It is nearly impossible to push through any
health reform without the validation of the consumer groups. The provider
community is often supportive of reforms that do not include significant cuts
to their current reimbursement rates. The insurers and the pharmaceutical
companies are often opposed to reforms that mandate significant cost con-
tainment while the business community is very focused on promoting cost
containment reforms.
Along with outreach to the various interest groups, there must be a
carefully designed communications strategy that is developed both for the
broader public message as well as the day-to-day press coverage of the
proposal. The press can play a constructive or destructive role, but they
frequently play a destructive role by default, as conflict is more newsworthy
than common ground. That is why I think that you will find that the best
reporters are those who recognize the conflict inherent in a reform debate
while simultaneously educating the public as to why such a reform is impor-
tant. It is necessary that they show what benefits can emerge with the pas-
2002] 413
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sage of a piece of legislation, as well as to fairly portray the alternative,
whether that be the status quo or another piece of flawed legislation.
In order to ensure a positive media relationship, it is essential to provide
sufficient and accurate information to enable the media to write knowl-
edgeably. The media need real evidence to support the contention that any
proposed solution is worth pursuing, and they are more likely to accept such
information if it is validated by independent sources.
No legislation can be enacted into law unless it is passed by the Con-
gress. Anyone who desires any legislation to be passed must understand the
role and the responsibility of the Congress. There is great interest in health
care on Capitol Hill, and a strong belief that their role is to be the final
legislator and compromiser of any initiative. Congress reacts harshly to any
hint that this authority could be undermined. As such, a well-understood
knowledge of the positions of key Members and Committees of Jurisdiction,
as well as a close working relationship with them, is essential. At least
initially, the role of the opposing party is frequently to raise serious concerns
about the proposal. Thus, policymakers' goal should not necessarily be to
achieve agreement at the beginning of the legislative process, but to provide
room for an acceptable compromise at the end of the process. It matters
little whether the compromise is something that the opponents want or fear
opposing; it matters significantly that the perception from the public is that
the final agreement is bipartisan in nature.
V. APPLYING THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION EXPERIENCE
Applying the lessons outlined previously to the experience of the
Clinton Administration helps explain why it failed to achieve success in
enacting the Health Security Act, but succeeded in enacting or implementing
a host of targeted health care reforms in the latter part of the Administration.
Regardless of the success or failure of particular policy priorities, the Ad-
ministration learned the importance of making health care a presidential
priority, and succeeded in laying the groundwork for the health care agenda
for years to come.
Applying these lessons to the Health Security Act, one can only con-
clude that despite an unprecedented effort, the outcome was, in retrospect,
preordained. By taking a comprehensive approach to reform, it was neces-
sary that almost all elements of the policy and the strategy be implemented
flawlessly. Unfortunately, this was not the case, as we failed in attracting
and retaining both internal and external validators that were critical to the
press and public evaluation of the policy. While we defined the problem and
414 [Vol. 26:403
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desired outcome quite well, we promoted a policy at a time when the trust in
the federal government was perhaps at its lowest. There was great dissatis-
faction with, for example, the government's inability to recognize the per-
ceived failure of the welfare system. As such, the idea that the federal
government would propose and significantly regulate health care was bound
to be vulnerable to fair and unfair criticisms of the proposed policy. This
helps explain why President Clinton now believes that in retrospect, it might
have been better to precede with welfare reform prior to pushing such an
ambitious health care initiative.
There were other timing problems, however. These included the fact
that the Administration had already pushed for very tough votes from the
Democratic Congress on deficit reduction and trade. We also were advocat-
ing a health care initiative at a time when the President and the First Lady
were being criticized (I believe unfairly and inaccurately) for a range of so-
called "scandals" such as Whitewater and Travelgate. Moreover, there were
foreign policy challenges, such as Haiti, that understandably distracted the
President. All this combined to undermine our traditional validators within
the groups and on Capitol Hill, and made it much more difficult and eventu-
ally impossible to produce a working majority in support of our policy to
secure universal coverage.
These factors, along with an overwhelming lobbying assault from
opponents of health care reform, served to not only undermine trust in the
government, but also trust in the President. The lesson here is that the
greatest motivating force in American politics is fear, not hope. Americans
are frequently more vulnerable to fear tactics designed to scare them into
thinking that they will lose something good than they are open to being
convinced that a new policy can improve their current lot in life. Republi-
cans, recognizing that public support for reform was diminishing and fear of
it was increasing, became less and less interested in making any compromise
on health care.
It is imperative to acknowledge, however, that many of these problems
outlined above were self-inflicted. We produced a policy that even some of
our own Administration did not support, and said so publicly. The policy
released was so detailed that it made it very susceptible to effective (yet
frequently unfair) criticism. Our sense of timing to promote this policy
perhaps could not have been worse. And our relationships with the Hill as a
consequence suffered significantly.
In contrast, subsequent health care efforts by the Clinton Administra-
tion were much more successful. They occurred subsequent to the reform of
the welfare system, and were targeted reforms that addressed insurance
2002]
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reforms, patient protections, children's health care, and Medicare and Medi-
caid modernization. They succeeded in making health care more accessible,
expanding coverage, extending the life of the Medicare trust fund to historic
levels, and producing the highest immunization rates and lowest infant
mortality rates in the nation's history. We also set the stage for future health
care debates on the Patients' Bill of Rights, expanding health insurance
coverage, modernizing Medicare to include a prescription drug benefit, and
reviving the public's interest in long-term care. These incremental reforms
were more inefficient than broader reforms would have been. Nevertheless,
such targeted reforms and successes were important perhaps at least as much
because they showed that government could develop and pass workable
health policy than they were comprehensive health achievements. Perhaps
most important, we succeeded in making health care a presidential priority,
something that I believe every subsequent President will have to emulate.
VI. LIKELY HEALTH CARE POLICY REFORMS IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION
Now, in Washington, we have a Republican administration and a
Republican Congress. Health care has not been their number one priority to
this point. Instead, they have focused on other issues, such as tax cuts,
defense, spending issues, and education (not necessarily in that order).18
Health care traditionally is not an issue that people often associate with the
Republican Party. People have been skeptical of their commitment, and they
feel that a lot of special interest groups are closer to them than they are to the
Democratic Party.
I think, however, that President Bush took a page from President Clin-
ton in the election. A lot of Republicans in the early 1990s were angry that
President Clinton talked so much about crime and welfare reform, tradition-
ally issues associated with Republican priorities. In fact, early in his first
term, President Clinton spent a lot of time and resources to illustrate his
commitment to these areas. He wanted to give the public a sense that he was
not only committed to traditionally Democratic issues, but with any issues
that frustrated the American people. These actions gave him common
ground with the center of the American public. President Bush has made
some early efforts to associate him with health policy reform, and has pro-
posed an interim solution he calls the "Helping Hand" solution to the pre-
18. Republican Liberty Caucus, at http://www.rlc.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
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scription drug benefit problem.' 9 This program is designed to help low
income people obtain health care and prescription drug benefits. 2°
Most Americans do not really focus on elections until election cycles.
There are strong Democrats and strong Republicans, but the people in the
middle are the ones who, in the end, influence elected politicians. So I
anticipate that President Bush will continue to do what he has already done
to a certain extent, both in the campaign and now, which is to acknowledge
that President Clinton raised very real health care issues that need to be
addressed and that there is an unfinished agenda that the American public
wants very strongly to get done.
VII. CONCLUSION
I always say that health care is the sex, drugs, and rock and roll of the
domestic policy scene. It is the fun issue. It has everything: it is complex, it
is emotional, it is special interest laden, it is money laden, it is full of poli-
tics, and it is full of policy. As maddening as it can be, it can also be the
most rewarding thing one can do. I can tell you personally from having done
work in health policy for so many years, that I have been privileged to meet
people, whether it is parents whose children did not have health coverage,
and now do, or the person who had a preexisting condition who could not get
health care before the implementation of the Kennedy-Kassebaum insurance
reforms,2 1 and now can, to someone who is now able to take time off to care
for a chronically ill spouse or parent because of the Family and Medical
Leave Act,22 or individuals with disabilities who are now able to go back to
work without the fear of losing their health coverage.
When you actually get policies enacted into law and see them making a
real difference in people's lives, there really is nothing like it. So I welcome
young, old, and committed new people to this field. I hope you will join the
cause and work towards improving the nation's health care system. As
Winston Churchill said, and I'm paraphrasing, "Americans will always do
the right thing, but not until they've exhausted every other option first."
Since we have tried almost every course of action, I have to believe we are
19. Morton M. Kondracke, Bush, Democrats Can Deal on Taxes, Medicare, Schools,
RoLL CALL, Jan. 4, 2001, available at http:llwww.rollcall.comfpages/columns/kondrake/oo/
2001/kond004.html.
20. Id.
21. See Press Release, supra note 16.
22. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2654 (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 825 (2001).
2002] 417
15
Jennings: A Conversation with Christopher C. Jennings
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
about to get it right. With your help, I hope and expect that we will achieve
the goal of assuring that every American has quality, affordable health care.
VII. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Student: I want to thank you for sharing some of the complexities of
the issue, for this was a very enlightening lecture. I do not know if your
definition of coverage expansion includes expansion of coverage for mental
health services, or is that a totally different battle?
Mr. Jennings: I have spent a lot of time talking to Tipper Gore about
those issues and we have succeeded in a number of important fields. First,
we passed the Mental Health Parity Act, which mandated that there should
no longer be inaccurate or discriminatory lifetime and annual caps on mental
health coverage. We required, through executive order, that all federal
employee health plans must have mental health parity in all benefits. The
implementation of this policy proved that mental health parity in health
coverage does not significantly increase health costs. This evidence may
prove to be a great tool for those advocates striving to extend mental health
parity to private health plans.
The Clinton Administration held a historic White House Conference on
mental health. We released the first Surgeon General report on mental
health. Tipper Gore served as a wonderful advocate for mental health, and I
am confident that she will continue to work on these issues. When we
passed the 1997 Balanced Budget Act we had to fight opponents of mental
health parity to ensure that mental health benefits would be part of the CHIP
program, which we succeeded in doing. I think that through the attention
that has been focused on mental health services within the last several years,
we are making real progress on these issues.
Student: On a pragmatic side, let's discuss finances. Incidents of fraud
within the health care system always seem to involve big bucks. As a tax-
payer, I say, okay, I am all for supporting those that need the assistance.
When you design these systems, do you, at all, consider the back end? What
are we going to do with those people caught abusing the system?
Mr. Jennings: That is a very good question. We have spent a lot of
time over the past eight years working to control health care fraud. We spent
a lot of time weeding out fraud in the Medicare program during the Clinton
Administration and we did it very successfully. In the minds of many pro-
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vider groups, we were too successful in this area. They feel that the Health
Care Financing Administration was far too aggressive in their enforcement;
they frequently felt that understandable compliance shortcomings resulting
from confusing directives from Medicare were not criminal acts.
So, in order to effectively fight Medicare fraud, you have to find the
right balance between strong enforcement and good communication with
providers. It is true that many Americans believe that if you just cut back on
the fraud, you would have all the money you need to take care of everyone. I
wish that were true, but it is not. There is no question that there must be
strong anti-fraud enforcement mechanisms to control fraud, and, also impor-
tantly, give yourself credibility on this issue. Americans must know that you
are doing everything you can to stop fraud. But you also need to diffuse the
public notion that no matter how successful you are, it will not be enough
money to take care of the problems.
I must say that I am proud, however, that the Medicare actuaries and
independent career analysts have concluded that the Clinton Administra-
tion's dedication to anti-fraud activities is one of the most important reasons
why we significantly extended the life of the Medicare trust fund during the
Administration. Additionally, I think our efforts have successfully changed
provider behavior, making it much less common for providers to bill for
services inappropriately.
Student: Sir, one other thing, also about financing. There is great
concern about a potential recession. Realistically, what will that do for the
efforts in Washington on health care?
Mr. Jennings: Well, it is interesting; sometimes in bad times you can
end up having more of a focus on health care. A lot of the surveys that are
most recently coming out are showing that people are concerned about job
layoffs. When the job security issue gets raised, so does people's fear of
losing their health care. When you lose your job you lose income, but it is
much easier to replace an income source than to replace health care. People
really fear losing health care.
In fact, in 1993, that was one of the driving forces for our attempt at
major health care reform. The people who feared losing health care were a
much more influential political force that those who were already uninsured.
So, interestingly, bad times can lead to more action on big issues. Now, I do
not anticipate that this recession would lead to discussions of universal
health coverage, but you might make efforts to expand coverage in other
ways. For example, one smaller policy that may become popular in a time of
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economic downturn is subsidies for COBRA coverage. Individuals who
leave or lose their jobs can opt to continue their health coverage by paying
102% of the premium their employer paid. However, many individuals
cannot afford to pay these premiums, but if you can develop a six-month or
year-long subsidy program for people who have lost their jobs, that stopgap
period could make a real difference, in both reducing numbers of uninsured
and creating a greater sense of security and trust in the government. So, in
an ironic way, bad economic times can lead to positive developments.
It is interesting to note that as private sector health care expenditures
have increased dramatically in recent years, we have succeeded in constrain-
ing health care spending to historic low levels. The outcome of this fact is
that the large surpluses we now have are largely attributable to our success at
moderating the growth of Medicare and Medicaid. I therefore believe that a
strong argument can and must be made that a significant portion of federal
surpluses should be dedicated to health care improvements. In the 1980s and
1990s, we always utilized health care savings to be the source of new financ-
ing for coverage improvements. While there no doubt will be an appropriate
interest in dedicating some of the surplus to tax cuts, it should not be at the
expense of long-overdue and needed investments in insurance coverage
expansions and a new Medicare prescription drug benefit. It is my hope that
the health care needs of the nation will not be bypassed by the tax cut fervor
that will almost inevitably be promoted by the new President and the Repub-
lican Congress. Only time will tell.
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